United Nations A/72/927–S/2018/679

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 25 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 25 June 2018 (see annex), addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

18-11870 (E) 230718

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Annex to the letter dated 25 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letters dated 8 and 14 June 2018 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/72/892-S/2018/549 and A/72/899-S/2018/608, respectively), which yet again contain false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I should like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion that notices to airmen are "illegally issued", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letters regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I should like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radio frequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all airports and seaports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly stated: "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)."

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2017 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport stood at 3,962,541, and this number is expected to be 4,200,294 in 2018. Moreover, in 2017, 27,197 aeroplanes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure and 189,787 aeroplanes used the Ercan advisory airspace, and these numbers are expected to reach 27,469 and 193,583, respectively, in 2018. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety, in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I should like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/72/928

General Assembly

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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 14
Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries

Note by the Secretary-General

In accordance with the charter of the Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 71/251, the Secretary-General hereby transmits to the Assembly the report on the work of the Bank in 2017 and the budget and programme of work of the Bank for 2018, as approved by the Council of the Bank. The documents are available at http://unohrlls.org/technologybank/.

18-11517 (E) 250718

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United Nations A/72/929–E/2018/77

General Assembly
Economic and Social Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 19
Sustainable development

Economic and Social Council
2018 session
27 July 2017–26 July 2018
Agenda items 5 (a) and 6

High-level segment: ministerial meeting of the high-level political forum on sustainable development, convened under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council

High-level political forum on sustainable development, convened under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council

Identical letters dated 12 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Economic and Social Council

I am writing to you regarding the voluntary national review presented by the Republic of Armenia to the high-level political forum on sustainable development in 2018.

In the report, Armenia attempts to mislead the high-level political forum and tries to justify its failure to ensure socioeconomic development by the so-called "blockade".

In this regard, I deem it necessary to state the following.

First and foremost, Armenia's socioeconomic hardship is a result of its expansionist policy towards its neighbours and total disrespect for norms and principles of international law. Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan and the subsequent occupation of a significant part of my country have led to the complete severance of relations between the two. Therefore, it would be nonsense for a country whose territory is under occupation, whose hundreds of thousands of citizens were subjected to atrocity crimes and notorious ethnic cleansing, to engage with the aggressor in any economic relations. Furthermore, in fact, the war unleashed by Armenia against my county left the Nakhchyvan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan totally cut off from the mainland of Azerbaijan.

Successive Armenian Governments have manifested their inability to prevent the socioeconomic conditions of its citizens from constant deterioration. A big number of reports from international and non-governmental organizations testify to that end.

18-11780 (E) 180718

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According to Transparency International, "corruption in Armenia is endemic and widespread, permeating all levels of society. The public administration, particularly the judiciary, the police and the health sector, are especially vulnerable to corruption. This situation is echoed by Armenia's poor performance in most areas assessed by governance indicators".[1]

The International Monetary Fund observes that "corruption and governance remain important impediments to growth".[2]

In addition to this, lower foreign investment, the collapse of remittances, the depreciation of the dram, inflation and a worsening financial performance of the energy sector put pressure on the Armenian economy. External debt has been steadily rising, reaching 56 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017. Nearly one-third of the population is living in poverty.[3] World Bank official statistics reveal that Armenia maintains one of the highest unemployment rates (18.2 per cent) in the world.[4]

The poor economic performance, poverty and unemployment deteriorate the demographic situation in Armenia. Under such circumstances, many young Armenians leave the country to find a job abroad. Some reports suggest that "30,000 people emigrate from Armenia annually"[5]. Furthermore, "dependence on remittances leaves the economy vulnerable to external shocks".[6]

Against this backdrop, however, according to the 2016 statistical data provided by the World Bank,[7] the military expenditures of Armenia constituted 4.1 per cent of the total GDP of the country, which makes Armenia one of the most militarized states in the world. Armenia ranks third in the world in the Global Militarization Index[8] issued by the Bonn International Center for Conversion.

In the context of the voluntary national review, it is worth mentioning that in the outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda, entitled "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the Heads of State and Government and high representatives, meeting in New York in September 2015, stated that there could be "no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development". They reaffirmed their commitment to international law and "the need to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of States".[9]

The military occupation of the territory of Azerbaijan does not represent a solution and will never produce an outcome desired by Armenia. The sooner Armenia withdraws its armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the earlier the conflict will be resolved and both countries and their peoples will benefit from the prospects of cooperation and economic development, thus enabling them to implement successfully the Sustainable Development Goals.

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[1] https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-armenia.

[2] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/19/Republic-of-Armenia-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-and-Fifth-and-Final-Review-Under-the-45107.

[3] https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/analyse-markets/armenia/economic-outline.

[4] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?view=map.

[5] http://asbarez.com/139232/un-projects-sharp-decrease-in-armenias-population.

[6] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/19/Republic-of-Armenia-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-and-Fifth-and-Final-Review-Under-the-45107.

[7] http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?report_name=countryprofile&id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=ARM.

[8] https://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-table%3fyear=2014&sort=rank_asc.

[9] General Assembly resolution 70/1, preamble and para. 38.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Economic and Social Council under agenda items 5 (a) and 6, as well as a document of the high-level political forum on sustainable development.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/72/930–S/2018/680

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Slovakia and South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

It is our honour to inform you that on 23 April 2018, the Permanent Missions of Slovakia and South Africa to the United Nations, in their capacity as co-Chairs of the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, co-hosted a high-level round table on security sector reform (SSR) and sustaining peace, with the support of the Security Sector Reform Unit in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.

The round table gathered over 70 participants, as well as representatives of multilateral organizations, including the African Union, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Bank and representatives from non-governmental organizations and academia.

It is our pleasure to present to you the attached statement by the co-chairs of the high-level round table (see annex I), which summarizes the key topics discussed during the event and highlights the recommendations that emerged from the deliberations. Further, we present the report of the high-level round table (see annex II). We should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as documents of the General Assembly under agenda item 34 (a) and of the Security Council.

Also, please allow us to express our sincere gratitude and commend the dedicated work of the Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, co-chaired by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP. The United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform remains committed to supporting the United Nations in enhancing its roles and approaches to SSR support processes.

(*Signed*) Michal **Mlynár**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Slovakia

(*Signed*) Jerry Matthews **Matjila**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of South Africa

18-11864 (E) 230718

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Annex I to the letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Slovakia and South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Co-chairs statement

High-level round table on security sector reform and sustaining peace co-hosted by the Permanent Missions of Slovakia and South Africa to the United Nations

23 April 2018

Background

1. The high-level round table on security sector reform (SSR) and sustaining peace took place on 23 April 2018 in New York, on the eve of the high-level meeting on "Peacebuilding and sustaining peace", held on 24 and 25 April 2018. The round table confirmed the contribution of SSR to the sustaining peace agenda by highlighting lessons from national SSR experiences and recognizing the significance of partnerships and adequate funding for SSR.

2. The Permanent Missions of Slovakia and South Africa to the United Nations, co-chairs of the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, co-hosted the round table with the support of the Security Sector Reform Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.

3. The round table was opened by Miroslav Lajčák, President of the General Assembly; Amina J. Mohammed, Deputy Secretary-General; and Xanana Gusmão, former President of Timor-Leste. The round table benefitted from the participation of Faustin-Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic; Didier Reynders, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Belgium; Marie-Noëlle Koyara, Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic; Fatima Kyari Mohammed, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; Ibrahima Diallo, Commissioner for Security Sector Reform of Mali; Momodou Badjie, National Security Adviser, and Major General Yakuba Drammeh of the Gambia; Sergio Londoño Zurek, Director General of the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation of Colombia; René van Nes, Deputy Head of Division of Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilization and Mediation at the European External Action Service; Barrie Freeman, Deputy and Political Director at the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office; Alexandre Marc, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group of the World Bank; Rüdiger König, Director-General for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany; and Paul Picard, Deputy Director for Operations Service of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Conflict Prevention Centre. Panels were facilitated by Alexander Zuev, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, Assistant Secretary-General and Director of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support at UNDP. In addition to the panellists and speakers

from the floor, representatives from 44 Member States[1] attended the event, as well as representatives from across the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations.[2]

4. In their statements, participants affirmed without a doubt that SSR is an essential element in the quest for political solutions to conflict, the prevention of conflict or relapse into violence, and the laying of a foundation for the rule of law and democratic governance. As reflected in Security Council resolution 2151 (2014), "an effective, professional and accountable security sector without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law is the cornerstone of peace and sustainable development and is important for conflict prevention". In addition, as noted in the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform (A/67/970–S/2013/480), "effective governance and oversight of the security sector to mitigate its politicization or instrumentalization can be vital to conflict prevention".

Focused seminars highlight security sector reform challenges in advance of the high-level round table

5. In 2017, the co-chairs of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform hosted two events that highlighted a number of important challenges to SSR, namely: the high-level dialogue on global experiences in SSR in New York, held on 11 and 12 May 2017, with a focus on conflict prevention and sustaining peace on the African continent; and the "High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace: Challenges and Opportunities", hosted by Slovakia, in Bratislava, on 5 and 6 June 2017, focused on the sustaining peace agenda as an approach to preventing the outbreak, continuation and recurrence of conflict and which required collective efforts across the entire peace continuum.

6. Subsequently, on 21 February 2018, the Permanent Missions of Belgium and Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations co-hosted the high-level seminar on SSR in West Africa, on the theme "Learning Lessons towards Sustaining Peace", focused on the importance of the SSR agenda across the entire peace and conflict spectrum, with emphasis on the United Nations role in coordination and the importance of national leadership, gender and inclusivity, representative and trusted security services, and adequate financing for SSR.

7. Most recently, on 1 March 2018, the Permanent Missions of Germany and Ethiopia to the United Nations co-hosted a policy discussion on SSR in South Sudan, during which participants noted the need for continued international engagement on SSR to shape peaceful settlements to conflict, as windows of opportunity are often quite narrow, as well as financially sustainable SSR processes and donor coordination.

Observations and recommendations emerging from the round table

8. In his opening remarks, the President of the General Assembly emphasized the role that security actors can play in maintaining stability, building trust between the state and communities, and protecting people from violence, if they are effective, accountable, professional and properly governed. The President also noted the efficacy of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, an approach,

[1] Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Belarus, Canada, China, Czechia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam and Zambia.

[2] International Peace Institute, United States Institute of Peace, NGO Committee on Sustainable Development and Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria).

co-chaired by the Department for Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP, to ensuring that reform efforts are coherent and focused on sustaining peace on the ground. In her remarks, the Deputy Secretary-General underlined the important role of SSR in peace processes, stabilization, transitions and prevention of conflict contexts across the entire peace continuum and as part of the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. She called for people-centred SSR that has significance in the lives of individuals, together with the need for enhanced governance, financing, expertise and assessments for the security sector. Mr. Gusmão emphasized that security is the most fundamental service provided by a state to its people, and a primary pillar of the social contract. He noted the importance of reconciliation; the centrality of national ownership to ensure that all citizens are agents of peace and development efforts; and the need for resources in support of nationally determined SSR priorities and processes.

9. The round table's first panel discussed national ownership and leadership on SSR and the importance of national policy and governance frameworks, as well as the inclusion of women and representation of diverse sectors of society in SSR processes from the outset. The Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, SSR components in peacekeeping, special political missions and non-mission settings, and the Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force have considerable experience supporting nationally led SSR processes, including in relation to Sustainable Development Goal 16. The round table panellists and speakers at preparatory events identified the following key observations and recommendations:

(a) **Parties to conflict should reflect their commitments to SSR in peace processes and agreements**. SSR provisions and terms of reference should be embedded where possible and appropriate in peace accords and new political architectures as early as possible, with dedicated, nationally led implementation and monitoring mechanisms established so as to monitor the impact of SSR on national policies, strategies and democratic governance. In South Sudan, the absorption of armed groups into the security sector without sufficient commitment to the 2005 peace agreement or resolution of ongoing divisions among the parties contributed to a relapse into conflict. The security sector split along political fault lines and continues to divide in accordance with ethnicity, regional interests and local security and economic allegiances. In Colombia, the Government felt it was inappropriate to discuss defence sector reforms within the framework of the peace talks with the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común, but the 2016 Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and the Cessation of Hostilities and the Laying down of Arms does contain important commitments relative to security, including a commitment to form the National Commission on Security Guarantees, a special investigation unit to dismantle organized criminal networks, a comprehensive protection plan for former combatants and a comprehensive approach to truth, justice, reparation and measures to prevent the repetition of serious crimes. In Côte d'Ivoire, the SSR process fostered the commitment of former armed groups to a unified Ivorian State, including through the integration of approximately 9,000 former combatants into the security forces. In Mali, the defence and security provisions of the 2015 peace agreement stipulate the principles of inclusivity and substantial representation in the security sector, progressive redeployment, fundamental reforms and the establishment of the National Council on Security Sector Reform. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) SSR supports the implementation of these provisions, which allude to the sensitive political issue of armed group representation in the security sector and the criteria for their integration. It will be important to reflect commitments to an inclusive and accountable defence sector and internal security forces within the African Union-led African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic.

(b) **National political efforts to consolidate peace and prevent relapse into violence should determine the parameters for United Nations SSR mandates in peacekeeping and special political missions**. In Côte d'Ivoire, the SSR component of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) coordinated international support to the nationally led SSR process, with a particular focus on supporting the development and implementation of the national SSR strategy. Support for a national inclusive dialogue platform around SSR and human security constituted a neutral, voluntary and inclusive mechanism to sustain peace and improve confidence, ownership and transparency with respect to SSR, fostering public accountability for security policy that complements formal democratic oversight functions. In Mali, the MINUSMA SSR team helps national institutions to implement the SSR measures of the peace agreement, including the strengthening of: the National Council on Security Sector Reform, which oversees the formulation of a new national security vision and strategy; the Integration Commission, which is responsible for designing criteria and quotas for the integration of former combatants; and the High Commissioner for Security Sector Reform. The Government of Mali intends to pursue development and SSR in tandem, while grappling with the challenges of integration, coordination of international SSR assistance and defining a national vision for the security sector. In Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) supported the Government in the revision of the 2008 national security strategy, advised on enhancing the professionalization and accountability mechanisms for the security sector and coordinated international assistance for SSR, including the transfer of security responsibilities to the Government.

(c) **As part of United Nations support to national ownership, the composition of the security sector should reflect the social, ethnic and geographic diversity of the country, and all members of society should be equally served, including women and children**. Inclusion can be facilitated through exchange and consultation mechanisms, joints seminars and trainings, as appropriate. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA supported the National Reconciliation Committee on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and SSR in developing the national SSR strategy in 2017. The former lays out a comprehensive approach to the construction of effective, accountable and ethnically and geographically representative security institutions capable of protecting the entire population as well as state institutions. The latter describes a gradual process of standing down of 14 major armed groups from across the country, some elements of which would integrate into the national uniformed services. The pilot disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme of the second half of 2017 supported 439 elements from armed groups, which represented a wide array of communities from geographically diverse areas and integrated 240 into the armed forces. In Mali, the institutional framework for SSR is broad and highly inclusive of all parties to the 2015 peace agreement. The Government of Côte d'Ivoire requested UNOCI to facilitate military interactive sessions to build trust and cohesion among existing members of the armed forces and newly integrated ex-combatants and to discuss the army-nation concept, gender and human rights. Women and youth associations were also invited to participate. The Government continued the sessions after six months of UNOCI support. UNOCI also supported local security governance, both by sensitizing local populations to the national SSR strategy and by facilitating the establishment of local security committees comprising regional officials and local security institutions, which assist in early warning and link the capital with localities, in line with the strategy.

(d) **Confidence-building measures can build trust between citizens and professional, accountable security providers**. In contexts in which the security sector has committed human rights violations, SSR processes emphasize the importance of restoring popular trust in reformed security forces. Transitional justice,

clear criteria for entry into the reformed security services and the tangible provision of security for the population can, when provided at the appropriate times, foster reconciliation and contribute to a new social contract. SSR support can be catalytic to other peace processes, especially in settings in which it has been requested by national authorities. In the Gambia, following the political transition in 2017, the Government undertook a series of civilian-military engagements and surveys to build citizens' confidence in the armed forces and internal security services, demilitarize rule of law institutions and promote the role of the police. The United Nations has supported a security sector assessment, a national security advisor and a technical SSR working group comprising members of the Government and civil society. In Timor-Leste, following a breakdown in security governance and oversight in 2006 and 2008, and subsequent conflict between the military and the police, the Government faced pressures to prioritize stability over individual accountability for past violations. However, together with national reconciliations efforts, a package of laws passed by the Government in 2011 on internal security, national defence and national security did succeed in enhancing parliamentary oversight of the security sector. In Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI support to confidence-building measures provided an underpinning to the establishment of inclusive regional security councils, deepening the territorial dimension of the national SSR process and improving local security governance.

(e) **United Nations coordination of support for nationally led SSR efforts should seek to ensure continuous support as peacekeeping or special political missions draw down**. The full assumption by national authorities in post-conflict settings of security and SSR tasks requires careful planning and ongoing international support. Both national political and economic commitment and dedicated resource mobilization are critical to sustain progress. In Liberia, the Justice and Security Joint Programme 2016–2019 between the Government, UNMIL and UNDP was designed to ensure seamless support for SSR during the Mission's drawdown. During the mission transition in Côte d'Ivoire, sustained UNOCI coordination of international assistance to the national SSR process with partners and the United Nations country team enabled the formulation of a nationally owned programme document to gather international technical and financial assistance to SSR priorities and promote the sustainability of critical initiatives.

10. Participants on the panel on partnerships and financing for SSR noted the role of regional, subregional and bilateral partnerships in supporting nationally owned SSR processes and called for United Nations coordination of these complex and sensitive processes. Nearly all participants underlined the importance of coordination at both the national and international levels. Participants also noted the role of the international financial institutions in SSR and observed that security and justice public expenditure reviews are valuable analytical and planning tools, and more specifically:

(a) **The United Nations plays a significant role in the coordination of international support to SSR, and there is a need to develop enhanced capacity and methodologies for this coordination with other international partners**. Coordination of SSR support among international actors is key to avoiding overlap and duplication of activities, enhancing coherence and efficiency, ensuring sustained approaches through the nexus of peacekeeping and development through a sector-wide response and reconciling the diverse agendas of multilateral and bilateral actors. Joint planning should be undertaken wherever feasible, including in such settings that involve sustaining peace as the Gambia and Burkina Faso.

(b) **There is a need to enhance the effectiveness and predictability of international support to SSR, including by ensuring greater clarity of roles between the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and OSCE**.

The July 2017 joint support plan on SSR and the rule of law in the Central African Republic agreed between MINUSCA, the European Union delegation and the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic offers a strong example of the potential of institutionalized cooperation agreements on SSR support. MINUSCA and the Training Mission worked jointly with the Government to develop the national defence plan, the military programming law and operational plans for the deployment of the Central African armed forces in joint operations with MINSUCA. The Security Council can play an important role through the provision of strong SSR coordination mandates for peace operations. In the light of resource limitations, there is a need for international commitment to ensuring that well-planned, longer-term and sustainable investments are made in SSR through a sector-wide approach.

(c) **The international community should commit to enhancing transparency of bilateral and multilateral security sector assistance, including in financing for SSR through official development assistance and other support**. Participants noted that, at the country level, all security sector assistance and funding should be tracked to facilitate transparency and foster national and international commitment to building governance and oversight structures to ensure sustained reforms. This would facilitate coordination and contribute to building security sectors which can be maintained by national governments.

(d) **International support for the reform of the defence and internal security forces as part of a credible, nationally led peace process can help ensure that national resources are available for social and economic development in addition to the extension of state authority across the country**. Colombia attributes the bilateral assistance provided for the strengthening of the national armed forces with ensuring the Government's ability to direct resources to development, the restoration of state presence and services to rural areas and the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime.

11. The round table also highlighted the utility of country-specific meetings of the Group of Friends, including on countries transitioning from peacekeeping to sustaining peace and development contexts. The co-chairs of the Group of Friends have resolved to hold such meetings as appropriate going forward.

Annex II to the letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Slovakia and South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Report of the High-level round table on security sector reform and sustaining peace[1]

Co-hosted by Slovakia and South Africa on behalf of the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform on the eve of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on peacebuilding and sustaining peace

New York, 23 April 2018

1. The high-level round table on security sector reform (SSR) and sustaining peace was held on 23 April 2018, in New York, at United Nations Headquarters. The event was co-hosted by the Permanent Missions of Slovakia and South Africa on behalf of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform on the eve of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, and with the support of the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. The event brought together a significant number of high-level participants to discuss two important issues: learning from nationally owned SSR experiences and enhancing partnerships and funding for SSR support. The present report provides a summary of the key issues discussed.

2. Opening statements were delivered by the President of the General Assembly at its seventy-second session, Miroslav Lajčák; the Deputy Secretary-General, Amina J. Mohammed; and former President of Timor-Leste and eminent person of the Group of Seven Plus, Kaya Rala Xanana Gusmão. This opening panel underlined that SSR is expected to play a key role in the successful implementation of both the sustaining peace and sustainable development agendas. As highlighted by the President of the Assembly, security actors can "hold the tools which can pull societies back from the brink of conflict — or push them over the edge". Hence, it was recognized that SSR is essential to ensuring that the role of security actors is positive, in terms of maintaining stability during periods of tension and protecting people from violence. If security services are to support sustaining peace, reforms should focus on improving their governance, in particular their effectiveness, accountability and professionalism, as crucial elements for success.

3. Still, while acknowledging the progress made by the United Nations — including by the adoption of Security Council resolution 2151 (2014) on SSR — as well as by other international partners, it was recognized that critical challenges remain in the provision of effective support to national SSR processes. In this context, it was emphasized that SSR should not be regarded as a stand-alone activity but rather as part of a wider strategy to sustain peace and prevent violent conflict, which must consider other issues, including access to basic services such as education and health care. In this spirit, it was highlighted that SSR is reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals and, in particular, in Goal 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies and effective, accountable and transparent institutions. The Deputy Secretary-General

[1] This report was prepared in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

stated that "at its heart, SSR is about ensuring safety and enabling women, men and children to live their lives free from fear".

4. Moreover, it was underlined that enhanced efforts are needed to address reforms of the security sector not only in conflict-affected regions, but also in contexts in which peace is fragile. As noted by Mr. Xanana Gusmão, sustaining peace cannot be a time-bound project; it requires addressing the root causes of problems. Furthermore, solutions must be grounded in the national contexts themselves. A one-size-fits-all approach to SSR will simply be unsustainable.

Learning from nationally owned security sector reform experiences

5. SSR remains a challenging endeavour that relies on the need for national leadership and national ownership. In this context, the first thematic panel was focused on "Learning from nationally-owned SSR experiences" and was moderated by Alexander Zuev, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions at the Department of Peacekeeeping Operations. The panel aimed to share national experiences from mission and non-mission contexts and further explore challenges and opportunities related to operationalizing the concept of national ownership and other principles set out in Security Council resolution 2151 (2014). The panel was composed of: Marie-Noëlle Koyara, Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic; Ibrahima Diallo, Commissioner for Security Sector Reform of Mali; Momodou Badjie, National Security Adviser of the Gambia; Yakuba Drammeh, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff of the Gambia; and Sergio Londoño Zurek, Director General of the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation of Colombia and acting mayor of the city of Cartagena. In addition, political statements were made from the floor, including by ministerial representatives of Belgium and Germany.

6. It was noted that national ownership is the cornerstone of any sustainable SSR process. However, concerns were raised that international actors at times undermine this ownership by their insufficient engagement in context-specific approaches that take into account the capacities and potential of each country. Different strategies were proposed to operationalize national ownership.

7. First, national experiences have shown that national ownership hinges on the capacity to build the trust and confidence of a population in the security services. The National Security Adviser and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff of the Gambia stated that SSR has been instrumental in overcoming the country's recent crisis and improving the trust of citizens in security actors. To that end, citizens have been actively engaged in an assessment of the security sector implemented by the Government alongside international actors, in particular the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union and the United Nations. Consultations were carried out with all parts of society in the Gambia to foster national ownership and support planning for reforms that can enable the development of people-oriented institutions.

8. Secondly, and in relation to the first strategy, it was emphasized that the principle of inclusivity must be at the centre of any SSR strategy and understood as a core element of trust-building among the population. In this respect, national ownership was recognized to encompass local ownership and ensuring that no one is left behind — not only in terms of the composition of the security services, but also in terms of who they serve. In Mali, for instance, the peace agreement specifically stipulates the principles of inclusivity and substantial representation in the security sector. Consequently, and as explained by the Malian Commissioner for Security Sector Reform, the national institutional framework for SSR is highly inclusive of different stakeholders. For example, a workshop held to develop a national strategy on SSR included representatives of civil society. In addition, efforts have been made

to integrate both the gender and age dimensions into the participatory processes in Mali, where it was underscored that women and youth must be involved, not only in the consultation process, but also in political decision-making. Similarly, the Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic explained that their 2017 national SSR strategy lays out a comprehensive approach to the construction of effective, accountable and ethnically and geographically representative security sector institutions capable of protecting the entire population. The President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadera, who also joined the round table, pledged to continue to move the SSR process in his country in this direction.

9. Thirdly, a sustained and holistic approach to peacebuilding was also viewed as critical to national ownership. Colombia is an important example of peace achieved after years of institutional capacity-building and of prioritizing peace on the development agenda. As underlined by the Director General of the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation of Colombia, peacebuilding efforts have required the investment of significant resources in strengthening the judiciary, promoting human rights and improving the governance mechanisms of the security services. It was noted that a number of measures required to implement the peace agreement were related to SSR, including, for instance, the establishment of a special investigative unit. However, while SSR was a cornerstone of the process, efforts to reform security institutions were implemented in parallel with other programmes, including education and economic initiatives.

10. Finally, it was acknowledged that without ongoing national dialogue, reform processes can lead to counterproductive results, given that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. In this regard, the United Nations and other partners engaged in a country should always first invest in promoting consensus-building and reconciliation initiatives among national stakeholders, as the baseline for any peacebuilding effort, including SSR. While recognizing that there will always be different needs to be accommodated in any given context, without national reconciliation efforts, there is no room to successfully build on national ownership.

Enhancing partnership and funding for security sector reform support

11. The second thematic panel was focused on "Enhancing partnerships and funding for SSR support" and was moderated by Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, Assistant Secretary-General and Director of its Bureau for Policy and Programme Support. The panel aimed to foster discussion on concrete steps that could be taken to strengthen partnerships for SSR support and, within this context, to enhance predictable and sustained financing for SSR support. The panel was composed of Fatima Kyari Mohammed, Ambassador and Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; René Van Nes, Deputy Head of the Division for the Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilization and Mediation at the European External Action Service of the European Union; Barrie Freeman, Deputy Head and Political Director of the Peacebuilding Support Office; and Alexandre Marc, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group at the World Bank. In addition, several representatives of multilateral organizations and the donor community took the floor, including from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Norway.

12. The panel underscored that all key areas of peacebuilding, including SSR, require effective partnerships and sustainable financing. Otherwise, the vision of future peace is unlikely to materialize and may generate frustration. In terms of partnerships, many examples of cooperation and coordination exist between and among different partners. For instance, the African Union-United Nations-European Union capacity-building programme provides an excellent example of how a cooperation framework can encourage joint endeavours. The recently published

United Nations-World Bank report entitled "Pathways for Peace" was also noted for its forward-looking approach and for planting the seeds for developing a common understanding on conflict prevention. In the field, there have also been some initiatives to better leverage resources and expertise. For instance, in the Central African Republic, coordination took place in support of a division of labour, with bilateral actors providing equipment while multilateral partners focused on the provision of training and governance-related support.

13. Additionally, some efforts have been made to strengthen coherence within organizations themselves. For instance, in the United Nations, ongoing reforms led by the current Secretary-General are expected to strengthen links across the Organization's three pillars and at all stages of conflict, throughout which SSR efforts should be taking place. Further, the United Nations global focal point for police, justice and corrections was recognized as a good example of how joint operational support can be provided in these component-specific areas. The Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform was also commended for its contribution to advancing important discussions intended to develop a more coherent approach within and beyond the United Nations.

14. However, while good practices and initiatives exist, it was underlined that there is room for further improvement. In particular, more must be done to institutionalize cooperation across multilateral organizations and to clarify roles and responsibilities among them. Indeed, the success of support to national SSR processes hinges on the capacity of international and regional organizations to deliver in a coherent and coordinated manner in line with national priorities. As such, the mapping study entitled "Supporting nationally led security sector reform: mapping the approaches of multilateral organizations", conducted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces at the request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and in cooperation with the African Union, the European Union and OSCE, was commended by several representatives of those organizations for taking a step towards identifying concrete recommendations based on empirical evidence on how to strengthen partnerships in support of sustaining peace. It was also announced that, following the expert-level workshop held in Brussels on 13 March 2018 to discuss the findings of the study, talks have begun on how to move forward in implementing some of those recommendations. This includes efforts to improve collaboration on guidance development processes and to identify upcoming opportunities to deploy joint assessment missions on SSR. It was also highlighted that the organizations must strive towards joint or at least coordinated dialogue with national counterparts and on the basis of shared analysis rather than individual engagement. It was acknowledged that such collaborative efforts should start at the early planning stages and that fruitful partnerships depend on the political will to build participatory relationships based on mutual trust.

15. Partnerships must also reflect the need to further leverage available resources to address realities on the ground and to enable the implementation of mandates. Sustainable and predictable funding is required to facilitate the comprehensive approach needed to provide support to SSR from an institution-building perspective. Yet, funding is often a main challenge, as most countries engaged in reform processes are emerging from conflict and have very fragile economies, lacking the necessary resources to undertake reforms. It was therefore recommended that peace agreements include the economic implications of the terms agreed to, including those related to SSR goals. At the same time, international support to financing was recognized as essential. While SSR is not cheap, it was highlighted that it is far cheaper than responding to an outbreak of conflict because a peace was too fragile to last. Strong calls were therefore made for investing in SSR, and in particular, providing more predictable and sustained financing in the area of SSR.

16. With these concerns in mind, there was a call to foster international commitment to enhance the transparency of bilateral and multilateral assistance to the security sector, including through broader development assistance. The cost of SSR processes must be transparent, efficient, and effective. It is expected that current reforms led by the Secretary-General will reduce fragmentation and improve coherence regarding the management and use of financial resources within the United Nations. In addition, panellists called for efforts to further exploit the potential of the Peacebuilding Commission to serve as a platform to convene all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, including Member States; national authorities; United Nations missions and country teams; international, regional and subregional organizations; international financial institutions; civil society; women's groups; youth organizations; and, where relevant, the private sector and national human rights institutions, in order to ensure predictable financing for peacebuilding.

Conclusion and way forward

17. Concluding remarks were delivered by Thomas Guerber, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, and Vasu Gounden, Executive Director and founder of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. It was underlined that the round table reaffirmed SSR as a core element of the sustaining peace and sustainable development agendas. Nonetheless, the litmus test for ensuring an effective contribution to those agendas will be whether the many opportunities identified at the round table can be successfully implemented in practice. In particular, the following key priorities were highlighted at the meeting as essential to enable SSR to contribute effectively to the sustaining peace agenda:

(a) National ownership: promote the principle of inclusivity and strengthen the trust of people in security services as a core element of enabling national leadership and ownership. This requires more efforts from international actors to adapt support to local contexts and help build national capacities in areas that can empower national authorities to lead and manage reforms.

(b) Partnerships: increase efforts to institutionalize cooperation across multilateral organizations and to clarify roles and responsibilities among them. This would enable more coordinated dialogue with national counterparts, on the basis of shared analysis as opposed to individual engagement. The implementation of recommendations in the mapping study on the approaches of multilateral organizations to SSR was identified as an important first step in this direction.

(c) Financing: ensure that the United Nations system, Member States and other partners have the necessary tools, capacities and political support to advance nationally led efforts as a core element of sustaining peace across the peace continuum. This includes investing financial resources in SSR support to ensure sustainable approaches to long-term reform efforts and fostering commitment to enhance the transparency of international assistance to the security sector.

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Letter dated 9 July 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting herewith the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the State border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of June 2018 (see annex I).*

I am also transmitting herewith record of the ceasefire violations by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic) registered by the Ministry of Defence during the month of June 2018 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mher **Margaryan**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex I to the letter dated 9 July 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia, 1–30 June 2018

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 June	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**13**	Small arms and light weapons: 192
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Movses	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Jil)
	Berkaber	1	Grenade launchers: 3
	Vazashen	2	Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Vahan)
	Jil	1	
	Geghamasar	3	
	Vahan	4	
2 June	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 16
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Geghamasar)
	Geghamasar	1	
3 June	**Tavush and Vayots Dzor regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 88
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Areni)
	Dovegh	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 22
	Areni	1	
4 June	**Tavush and Vayots Dzor regions**	**8**	Small arms and light weapons: 650
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 55
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 80 (Areni)
	Areni	6	
5 June	**Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	**8**	Small arms and light weapons: 260
	Areni	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30
	Zangakatun	3	
6 June	**Tavush, Ararat and Vayots Dzor regions**	**12**	Small arms and light weapons: 492
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 35
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Areni)
	Zangakatun	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	Tigranashen	5	
	Areni	3	
7 June	**Tavush, Ararat, Vayots Dzor and Syunik regions**	**14**	Small arms and light weapons: 1,373
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 120
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 258 (Zangakatun: 150; Yelpin: 100; Areni: 8)
	Zangakatun	5	Large-calibre machine guns: 120
	Areni	3	
	Yelpin	2	
	Agarak	2	
8 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor regions**	**14**	Small arms and light weapons: 300
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Areni)
	Kolagir	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 105
	Paravakar	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Jil	4	
	Tsapatagh	2	
	Areni	3	
9 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 66
	Vazashen	1	
	Kutakan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
10 June	**Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 168
	Jil	1	
	Zangakatun	2	
11 June	**Vayots Dzor region**	**1**	Small arms and light weapons: 10
	Khndzorut	1	
12 June	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 82
	Aygepar	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Zangakatun	2	
13 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat and Vayots Dzor regions**	**12**	Small arms and light weapons: 221 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Chinari	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Kakhakn	5	
	Areni	2	
	Papuyr Sevak	1	
	Zangakatun	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
14 June	**Ararat and Syunik regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 89
	Zangakatun	2	
	Bardzravan	1	
	Gorayk	1	
15 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	**18**	Small arms and light weapons: 789 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27
	Aygedzor	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Paravakar)
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	4	Large-calibre machine guns: 129
	Vazashen	1	
	Berdavan	2	
	Vahan	1	
	Yelpin	3	
	Zangakatun	1	
16 June	**Gegharkunik, Ararat and Vayots Dzor regions**	**6**	Small arms and light weapons: 227
	Pambak	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Zangakatun	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Areni	2	
	Yelpin	1	
17 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat and Vayots Dzor regions**	**12**	Small arms and light weapons: 234 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12
	Aygedzor	2	(Aygedzor: 3; Yelpin: 9)
	Jil	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 19
	Ttujur	1	
	Zangakatun	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Chiva	1	
	Areni	2	
	Yelpin	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
18 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat and Vayots Dzor regions**	**15**	Small arms and light weapons: 269 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 52
	Chinari	1	(Tsapatagh: 6; Geghamasar: 14, Yelpin: 32)
	Movses	2	
	Tsapatagh	1	
	Geghamasar	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Zangakatun	2	
	Tigranashen	1	
	Yelpin	2	
	Areni	2	
19 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	**12**	Small arms and light weapons: 200 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 91
	Movses	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Vahan	2	
	Chambarak	1	
	Yelpin	2	
	Areni	2	
	Zangakatun	2	
20 June	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**6**	Small arms and light weapons: 110
	Aygedzor	1	
	Kolagir	1	
	Zangakatun	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	2	
21 June	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**10**	Small arms and light weapons: 153
	Aygedzor	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Movses	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	2	
	Tigranashen	1	
22 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**19**	Small arms and light weapons: 458
	Aygedzor	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 28
	Aygepar	2	(Avazan: 18; Vahan: 10)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 35
	Vazashen	1	
	Kayan	3	
	Avazan	3	
	Vahan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
23 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor regions**	**7**	Small arms and light weapons: 77
	Aygedzor	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Aygedzor)
	Movses	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Jivanavan	1	
	Areni	1	
24 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 13
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	Chambarak	1	
	Khachik	1	
25 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 17
	Kayan	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Geghamasar	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
26 June	**Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Ararat and Syunik regions**	**6**	Small arms and light weapons: 137
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Tsghuni)
	Areni	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 25
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Tsghuni	1	
27 June	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Syunik regions**	**6**	Small arms and light weapons: 147
	Baghanis	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 170
	Vahan	1	
	Chambarak	2	
	Tsghuni	2	
28 June	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**6**	Small arms and light weapons: 51
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Jil)
	Berkaber	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 300
	Jil	1	Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Chambarak)
	Chambarak	1	
29 June	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**5**	Small arms and light weapons: 53
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Vazashen)
	Vazashen	3	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Jil		
30 June	**Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	**3**	Small arms and light weapons: 18
	Kakhakn	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9
	Areni	1	
	Zangakatun		

During the reporting period, two soldiers of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia were wounded from fire by the Azerbaijani side.

Annex II to the letter dated 9 July 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic), 1–30 June 2018

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 916 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Nuzger: 2; Mehdili: 2)
2 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 246 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Sarijali:1; Yarimja: 3)
3 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 187 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Omar) Large-calibre machine guns: 12
4 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 408 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23
5 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	41	Small arms and light weapons: 394 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Mehdili) Large-calibre machine guns: 15
6 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 112 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
7 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 224 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Gjulistan)
8 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	25	Small arms and light weapons: 229 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 33 Large-calibre machine guns: 15
9 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	9	Small arms and light weapons: 76 Large-calibre machine guns: 22 Grenade launchers: 1
10 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	13	Small arms and light weapons: 82 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Gjulistan)
11 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 305 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd)
12 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 120 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
13 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 189 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Jraberd)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
14 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 362 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd)
15 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	48	Small arms and light weapons: 484 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 35 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 32 (Kuropatkino: 10; Seysulan: 6; Verin Chaylu: 4; Mrov: 12)
16 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 451 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Kuropatkino: 2; Gjulistan: 20)
17 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	12	Small arms and light weapons: 182 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
18 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 116 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Mehdili) Large-calibre machine guns: 4 Grenade launchers: 1
19 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 119 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9
20 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	26	Small arms and light weapons: 225 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
21 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 410 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Shikhlyar)
22 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 282 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 28
23 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 151 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8 Grenade launchers: 3
24 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 243 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26
25 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 154 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18
26 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 162
27 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	25	Small arms and light weapons: 139 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12
28 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 87 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
29 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	8	Small arms and light weapons: 111 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
30 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 192 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Karvend)

During the reporting period, one soldier of the defence army of Artsakh was killed and one soldier was wounded from fire by the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations A/72/932

General Assembly

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17 July 2018
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Original: Russian

Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (a)
Promotion and protection of human rights: implementation of human rights instruments

Letter dated 22 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation at the thirty-sixth meeting of States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under agenda item 6, entitled "Other matters" (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 72 (a).

(*Signed*) D. **Polyanskiy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-11891 (E) 200718 230718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 22 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation at the thirty-sixth meeting of States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under agenda item 6, entitled "Other matters"

14 June 2018

We would like to take this opportunity to once again comment on some aspects of the work of the Human Rights Committee.

We note with concern the growing tendency of the treaty bodies, including the Human Rights Committee, to independently review the provisions of the relevant international treaties, both in terms of the obligations of States parties and working methods, in an effort to broaden the interpretation of international norms and promote contentious concepts that have little in common with the substance of the treaties.

The drafting by the Committee of a general comment on the implementation of article 6 of the Covenant, concerning the right to life, is especially troubling. The experts are proposing a very liberal and broad interpretation of the concept of the right to life, thereby de facto creating new obligations for States parties to the Covenant. We should like to recall that the Committee's work is governed by the relevant provisions of the Covenant, which do not include the creation of such normative functions.

In our view, general comments are solely the personal opinions of the treaty body experts and, therefore, may not impose on States any obligations additional to those undertaken by them when ratifying or acceding to an international treaty, unless otherwise declared by a State on a voluntary basis. For our part, we shall continue to be guided solely by the provisions of the relevant international treaties in the follow-up to their implementation.

As we noted two years ago, the Committee's follow-up procedures are an unwarranted increase in the work of the treaty bodies and take up additional time and resources for intersessional correspondence with States. We should like to recall that this practice is not provided for by the relevant international treaties and places an additional burden on States. We believe that the system established for State reporting to treaty bodies, namely, the regular submission of periodic reports, is the optimal tool. This is because each subsequent report contains information on the implementation of earlier concluding comments and recommendations.

It is questionable whether it is legitimate for the Human Rights Committee to plan the holding of joint meetings and coordination sessions with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and also whether individual communications should be considered, given the different number not only of States parties to the Covenants, but also of States that have accepted the individual communications procedure adopted by both Committees. Such attempts to combine the work of the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights clearly go beyond the scope of the international legal instruments that established them.

We see no legal grounds for the Committee's new practice of publishing open letters addressed to States on its website. The advisability and usefulness of doing so is dubious and has counterproductive effects, since this approach does not contribute

towards fostering a constructive dialogue between States parties and the Human Rights Committee and threatens to further increase the politicization of the Committee's work.

Nothing other than the politicization of the Committee's work can explain its decision concerning an individual complaint in which the Russian Federation allegedly allowed the provisions of the Covenant to be violated in a situation occurring 30 years prior to the accession to the Covenant by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russia, as its successor State. The adoption by the Committee experts of such concluding observations is completely unacceptable because it violates the principle prohibiting the retroactive application of legal norms and demonstrates the political nature of the Committee's findings. The Russian Federation has taken note of the separate opinion of four Committee experts, but does not recognize the conclusion drawn in that case.

In conclusion, we would like to express the hope that the problems identified will facilitate a more substantive discussion on improving the work of the treaty bodies, both with the experts of these oversight mechanisms themselves and with other States.

United Nations A/72/933

General Assembly

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19 July 2018
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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (a)
Promotion and protection of human rights: implementation of human rights instruments

Letter dated 2 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation during the seventeenth meeting of States parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child under agenda item 6, entitled "Other matters" (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 72 (a).

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

18-12008 (E) 240718 260718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 2 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation, Ms. Ghuzal M. Khusanova, during the seventeenth meeting of States parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child under agenda item 6, entitled "Other matters"

29 June 2018

The Russian Federation is committed to strictly upholding its international legal obligations to protect the rights of children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been the main reference point and indisputable authority in this field for the entire international community for almost three decades. That is why we attach great importance to the work of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which was established in accordance with this international treaty. An important prerequisite for constructive and effective engagement with States parties is that the Committee should strictly abide by its mandate.

In that context, and based on our own experience, we would like to comment on certain aspects of the Committee's work.

We are obliged to note with regret that this treaty body often departs from its core task, namely assisting States parties to the Convention and its Optional Protocols in fulfilling their obligations under these international instruments.

The Committee's practice of holding closed meetings with representatives of civil society would appear to go against the principles of transparency and impartiality. Building on the positive experience of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, we recommend that such meetings be held in open session.

The working methods for the participation of children in the reporting process of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the Committee in 2014 (CRC/C/66/2), continue to be unacceptable. The theme of the general discussion during the Committee's seventy-ninth session in September 2018 — "Protecting and Empowering Children as Human Rights Defenders" — is another serious concern.

In the light of the presentation by the Russian Federation of its initial report on the implementation of the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, we would like to comment on a number of the Committee's concluding observations.

First of all, we believe that the concluding observations should not include passages whose content was not discussed during the consideration of the report. This particularly pertains to the observation in paragraph 36 (the recommendation to ratify the Optional Protocol on a communications procedure).

The excessive trust that Committee experts place in unsubstantiated and unverified information provided by non-governmental entities is a matter for concern. The allegations in paragraphs 23 and 25 concerning sex tourism and child pornography, for example, are based on such unverifiable statements made by civil society.

Furthermore, the information provided by the delegation both in the report and in additional written replies, as well as in the explanations given during the dialogue

with treaty body members, were not taken into account in the following concluding observations: paragraph 6 (on data collection); paragraph 13 (on awareness-raising); paragraph 19 (on children at risk); paragraph 21 (on child marriage); paragraph 26 (on measures to prevent and address online sexual child exploitation and abuse); and paragraph 28 (on conformity of existing criminal legislation with the provisions of the Optional Protocol).

The recommendation in paragraph 17 — to implement the Committee's general comment No. 19 (2016) on public budgeting for the realization of children's rights — is unacceptable. We consider that such initiatives, which have not been intergovernmentally agreed, are solely the private opinions of experts and may not impose new obligations on States additional to those undertaken by them when ratifying or acceding to an international treaty, unless otherwise declared by a State on a voluntary basis. We shall continue to be guided exclusively by the articles of the Convention and its two Optional Protocols in the follow-up to their implementation.

The recommendations contained in paragraph 8 (taking into account the outcomes of the world congress against commercial sexual exploitation of children) and paragraph 24 (dissemination of the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism and the Code of Conduct for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation in Travel and Tourism) clearly go beyond the Committee's mandate. We should like to recall that, in accordance with article 12 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee may request from States parties further information relevant to the implementation of that Protocol, but reports related to the implementation of other international instruments do not fall within the Committee's mandate.

In view of the above, the Russian Federation wishes to declare that it does not consider itself bound by an obligation to comply with the recommendations of the Committee contained in the aforementioned concluding observations.

United Nations A/72/934–S/2018/681

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 9 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate documents recording the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (annex II) during the month of May 2018.

I also wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued two notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force during May 2018.

It should be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

The said actions of Turkey, which has illegally occupied the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974, clearly aim at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In this respect, I would like to underline, once again, that there is only one legal authority in Cyprus, namely the Republic of Cyprus, as stipulated in various Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), in which the Council declared the establishment of the so-called "trnc" null and void.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest against the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

18-12019 (E) 250718

Please recycle

Finally, I would like to urge Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to heed the calls of the international community and contribute to a meaningful resumption of the peace process, instead of focusing on undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 9 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 May	0842–1247	One E7-T Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
	1325–1415	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 May	0944–1402	One E7-T Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
4 May	1020–1200	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1047–1340	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
6 May	0952–1000	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1435–1453	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
8 May	1046–1320	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
9 May	1041–1135	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1047–1215	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
10 May	1015–1150	One AB-412 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1040–1220	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 May	0946–1115	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
12 May	1145–1159	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1755–1811	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
14 May	1104–1341	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1505–1654	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
15 May	1032–1205	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1356–1512	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1450–1558	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2008–2024	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 May	1150–1210	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1430–1545	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1724–1738	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2310–2319	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 May	1336–1423	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
18 May	1050–1100	One UH-1H Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 May	1217–1240	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1501–1519	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 May	1231–1250	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1551–1609	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
23 May	1255–1505	One UH-1H and one AS-532 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1347–1418	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1735–1751	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2115–2227	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 May	1518–1620	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1611–1635	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 May	1036–1055	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1255–1555	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1443–1458	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 May	0850–0923	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1130–1200	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
29 May	0839–1233	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0949–1115	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
30 May	0916–0935	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1010–1027	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1014–1050	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1157–1342	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1316–1506	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1410–1500	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1434–1502	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 9 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1–7 May	One A-595 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
2 May	One A-571 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
2–4 May	One P-349 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
4–21 May	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
8–10 May	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
11–13 May	One F-245 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
12–13 May	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
16–22 May	One P-349 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
18–29 May	One A-1581 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia
19–22 May	One S-355 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
22–28 May	One F-245 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
23–31 May	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
25–30 May	One F-246 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

Dates	*Nature of violation*
28 May	One P-176 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
29–30 May	One A-1581 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta
30–31 May	One P-349 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
30–31 May	One A-1581 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta
31 May	One F-247 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

United Nations A/72/935–S/2018/714

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda items 34 and 109

Prevention of armed conflict

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 18 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the fourth anniversary of the downing of flight MH17 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 109, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-12028 (E) 230718

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Annex to the letter dated 18 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the fourth anniversary of the downing of flight MH17

17 July will forever remain in our memory as a tragic day of a terrible terrorist act, which killed 298 people. Four years ago, the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down by the Russian anti-aircraft missile system "Buk".

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its sincere condolences to all relatives and next of kin of those who died in this catastrophe.

Currently it is our common duty and matter of honour to establish and bring to justice those involved in the downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17.

Throughout four years, the Joint Investigation Team, which includes investigators and prosecutors from the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Malaysia and Ukraine, has been working hard and scrupulously in order to identify perpetrators and bring them to justice.

It has already been established that the missile system "Buk", which shot down the MH17, belonged to the 53rd Air Defence Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces. It was illegally delivered on the territory of Ukraine through the uncontrolled part of the Ukrainian-Russian state border and hastily returned back to Russia after the downing of the aircraft.

Such actions are not only criminally punishable, but also constitute violation of the norms of international law. Ukraine resorted to the International Court of Justice to prove that the Russian Federation, by such actions, violated the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Ukraine welcomes and supports the initiative of the Netherlands and Australia to bring the Russian Federation to responsibility for its role in downing the MH17 flight.

Last week the Agreement between Ukraine and the Netherlands on international legal cooperation regarding crimes related to the downing of flight MH17 was almost simultaneously ratified by the parliaments of the Netherlands and Ukraine.

We will continue to provide all possible assistance in this important case and will cooperate with our partners for the sake of the establishment of justice.

United Nations A/72/936–S/2018/719

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Security Council

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25 July 2018

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict: prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 19 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in connection with reports on leakage of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission official data for the benefit of the Russian Federation special services (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-12371 (E) 300718

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Annex to the letter dated 19 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in connection with reports on leakage of the Special Monitoring Mission official data for the benefit of the Russian Federation special services

19 July 2018

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine perceived with concern reports on the threat to security of the monitors of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine due to the likely interference of the Russian Federation special services into the work of the SMM aimed at discrediting the SMM's monitoring activities in line with its mandate.

In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the SMM to inform on the measures that would be taken to avoid the recurrence of such cases in the future.

The Ukrainian side condemns any actions that negatively affect the safety of SMM monitors, including threats to their address, restriction of freedom of movement or theft of official or private data.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine strongly condemns the continuation by the Russian Federation of a purposeful policy of aggression against Ukraine, including by undermining the authority of the SMM and preventing the Mission from fulfilling its mandate.

United Nations A/72/937–S/2018/721

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
20 July 2018

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 13 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the decisions of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the cases of Ukrainian citizens Yevhen Panov and Volodymyr Balukh (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-12133 (E) 250718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 13 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the decisions of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the cases of Ukrainian citizens Yevhen Panov and Volodymyr Balukh

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its resolute protest over the decisions of the so-called "courts" of the Russian occupation authorities of 13 July 2018 on the cases of citizens of Ukraine Yevhen Panov and Volodymyr Balukh.

The charges against Yevhen Panov of "involving in subversive and terrorist activities" are fabricated and politically motivated, and his sentence to 8 years in a high-security colony is illegitimate.

It is of particular concern that Yevhen Panov faced tortures during "pre-trial investigations", which is a flagrant violation of the basic norms of international law in the human rights area, enshrined, inter alia, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a number of international conventions against tortures and other inhuman treatment.

We strongly condemn the ongoing repressions against Volodymyr Balukh, who has been denied today the parole by the "zaliznychnyi district court" in the occupied Simferopol.

We demand from the occupant country to stop repressions against the citizens of Ukraine Yevhen Panov, Volodymyr Balukh and over 60 of our compatriots, who are held by the Kremlin regime in Russia and in the occupied Crimea, to release them and to provide their unhindered return home.

We demand once again that Russia must implement to their full the resolutions of the UN General Assembly "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" of 27 March 2014, "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine" of 19 December 2016 and of 19 December 2017 as well as the order of the International Court of Justice regarding provisional measures in the case of Ukraine vs Russia regarding the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

We call on the international community and international human rights organizations to use all possible legal and diplomatic means aimed at releasing the Ukrainian citizens, illegally detained in Russia and in temporarily occupied Crimea; bringing those responsible for human rights violations and tortures in occupied Crimea to account; as well as to strengthen their pressure on the occupant state to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

United Nations A/72/938–S/2018/722

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda items 34, 72 (c) and 74

Prevention of armed conflict

Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Report of the International Court of Justice

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 19 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the reaction of the International Court of Justice on Ukraine's request to interpret its order on the provisional measures (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 72 (c) and 74, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-12373 (E) 300718

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Annex to the letter dated 19 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the reaction of the International Court of Justice on Ukraine's request to interpret its order on the provisional measures

Today, the International Court of Justice informed the Agent of Ukraine — Deputy Foreign Minister Olena Zerkal on its position regarding implementation by the Russian Federation the Court's Order of 19 April 2017 indicating provisional measures in the case Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation).

In that Order, the Court required Russia to "refrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions, including the Mejlis".

In defiance of this clear order, the Russian Federation has failed to lift its ban on the Mejlis, first imposed in April 2016. In letters to the Parties today, the Court has reaffirmed the binding nature of its Order and directed Russia to report on concrete steps taken to implement it by 18 January 2019.

Continued defiance by Russia of the World Court's binding orders will not be accepted.

Ukraine calls upon the Russian Federation to live up to its international obligations by promptly suspending its ban on the Mejlis, as required by the Court's original Order and its reaffirmation of that Order today.

United Nations A/72/939–S/2018/706

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2018
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 29 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of May 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-12418 (E) 300718 070818

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 29 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in May 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 May	1130	The herder Isma'il Sa'b took his livestock to graze on the outskirts of the town of Shab'a, near observation point OP1, which is staffed by the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The livestock returned at 16.30 hours without the shepherd. At 2020 hours, the liaison unit of the UNIFIL reported that the shepherd had been detained by the Israeli enemy.
	1715	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Khiyam near Barad al-Tuffah, the Israeli enemy hurled four smoke bombs towards several civilians in Sahl al-Khiyam. The bombs landed inside Lebanese territory, but no one was injured.
3 May	1000	A Lebanese Army patrol came across a suspicious object, which appeared to be a bomb, inside Lebanese territory near point BP87. It is believed that the object was one of the four smoke bombs that the Israeli enemy hurled towards civilians in Sahl al-Khiyam on 2 May 2018.
	1000 1035	The sound of several bursts of medium and light weapon fire was heard around the Summaqah outpost in the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1130	On the outskirts of Shab'a town, near observation point OP2, which is staffed by the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, the Israeli enemy released shepherd Isma'il Sa'b, whom they had abducted on 2 May 2018. The enemy did not coordinate his release with UNIFIL.
	1145	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite point BP14 and the town of Rumaysh, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank, 10 personnel and a police dog crossed the technical fence, proceeding on their way approximately 20 metres without crossing the Blue Line. They inspected the site and photographed the Lebanese Army position at the wall. Meanwhile, the tank pointed its cannon towards the position. The hostile patrol left at 1235 hours and returned to occupied Palestinian territory.
	1700	Inside Lebanese territory, in the area of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Husayn Yunis found balloons in the garden of his house that had Hebrew writing on them. A Lebanese Army patrol was dispatched to the site. The patrol took the balloons and began an investigation.
8 May	1600 1900	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, on the outskirts of Sha'ba town, several bursts of light and medium military-weapon fire were heard.
9 May	0940	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Army checkpoint at Udaysah, the Israeli enemy installed a camera on an emplacement opposite the checkpoint and pointed it towards Lebanese territory. At 1300 hours, the Israeli enemy removed camera.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
10 May	1530	On the outskirts of Kafr Shuba town, in the locality of Birkat Ba'tha'il, some 48 cows crossed the so-called line of withdrawal. They headed back towards the occupied territories at 1940 hours.
11 May	1148	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a construction vehicle stopped opposite the town of Udaysah, at point TP37. Four soldiers descended from the vehicles and carried out maintenance work on the technical fence. One of the soldiers pointed a 12.7 mm calibre machine gun towards Lebanese territory. The work ended at 13.10 hours and the hostile patrol left in the direction of occupied territory.
	1715 1750	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the sound of light and medium military-weapon fire was heard.
12 May	915	On the outskirts of Kafr Shuba town, in the locality of Birkat Ba'tha'il, some 25 cows crossed the so-called line of withdrawal. They headed back towards the occupied territories at 1730 hours.
14 May	1510 1600	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, several bursts of light and medium military-weapon fire were heard.
	2215	An Israeli enemy foot patrol approached from inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Wazzani resort. The patrol members directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory before leaving at 2310 hours.
15 May	1210	Opposite Yarun, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising one Hummer vehicles and two civilian vehicles arrived at the Jabal al-Tayyarat west position and carried out maintenance work there. As they were working, a member of the enemy patrol pointed his weapon towards the members of a Lebanese Army patrol that was on the Lebanese side of that location. The enemy patrol departed and headed into occupied territory at 1320 hours.
16 May	1000	Inside occupied territory, opposite the Rumaysh gate position, a Merkava tank crossed the technical fence near the Khallat al-Budiyah position. The tank took up a position at that location and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory, without violating the Blue Line. The tank departed and headed towards the Rumaysh gate at 1100 hours.
	1600	As the shepherd Mahir Hamdan was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, locality of Shahl, an Israeli enemy foot patrol consisting of eight personnel crossed some 30 metres past the line of withdrawal (the Blue Line, to which a claim is maintained in that area) and attempted to abduct him, but it failed.
21 May	1535	As the civilian Isma'il Zahra was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, in the locality of Khallat al-Wasi'ah–Jabal al-Shahl, an Israeli enemy foot patrol comprising eight personnel emerged from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms and fired into the air in the direction of the herd, which was inside Lebanese territory. No one was injured in the incident.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
23 May	1550	As the civilian Qasim Zahrah was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, locality of Birkat al-Naqqar, opposite position C7-4, which is staffed by the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, a nine-person Israeli enemy that was inside the occupied Shab'a Farms fired two rounds towards Lebanese territory. No one was injured in the incident.
24 May	1420	As the civilian Isma'il Zahrah was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, in the locality of Sha'b al-Maqil–Jabal al-Shahl, an Israeli enemy patrol fired into the air in the direction of the herd. No one was injured in the incident.
28 May	0640 0800	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, on the perimeter of the Ruwaysat al-Alam position, two Merkava tanks were observed moving and the sound of several burst of medium and light weapon fire was heard.

Sea violations committed in May 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 May	0530	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011 for an eight-minute period, proceeding on its way some 70 metres. The crew of the launch used loudspeakers to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel and launched a noise bomb inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 May	1810	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 130 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 May	1834	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 185 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
8 May	2119	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period.
9 May	2100	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
11 May	0300	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0330	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
13 May	1813	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a one-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
15 May	0217	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0222	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0229	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0330	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 10-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 535 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0402 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 73-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 515 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0415	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0739	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0955	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 204 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
18 May	0255	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 60-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0301	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0307	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for an 18-minute period.
	0322	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 10-minute period.
	0348	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a seven-minute period and sounded warning sirens.
19 May	1805	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a seven-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1834 hours, it violated the boundary again for a six-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2128	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 55 metres. The launched fired three flares towards a Lebanese fishing vessel that was in Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
20 May	2005	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for an 11-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2035 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 9-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2040	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launched a flare shell over Lebanese territorial waters.
22 May	1232	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 13-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1336	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 29-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1338	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 27-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 May	1416	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 20-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1500	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 28-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 460 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1502	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 26-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1600	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 20-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 220 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1837	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
23 May	0336	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. During the incursion, a searchlight was directed towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0346 hours, it violated the boundary again for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 515 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0359 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for a 21-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 570 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0412	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.
26 May	1122	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 10-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 May	0802	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1802	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
30 May	1837	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in May 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 May	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1125 hours over Rumaysh.
	0900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1025 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over Rumaysh.
2 May	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1030 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1530 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1350 hours over Naqurah.
	1245	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2045 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2245 hours over Rumaysh.
	2035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2200 hours over Naqurah.
3 May	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1815 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1255	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
4 May	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1730 hours over Yarun.
	0900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1030 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
5 May	0130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1505 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1140 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1335	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over the all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1445 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2110 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1810	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1925 hours over Rumaysh.
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0035 hours over Naqurah.
6 May	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1140 hours over Kafr Killa.
7 May	1555	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1635 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1640 hours over Aytarun.
	1720	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Shuf, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1910 hours over Kafr Killa.
8 May	1020	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1240 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1255	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1405 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2035	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 2145 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2320	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over the Shuf, the Western Bekaa, the South and the sea between Shikka and the South. They left at 0030 hours on 9 May over the sea west of Naqurah.
9 May	0215	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over the sea between Shikka and the South before leaving at 0245 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1100 hours over Rumaysh.
	2020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2115 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
10 May	0220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah and proceeding as far as Nabatiyah. They left at 0315 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1650 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1600	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1645 hours over Rumaysh.
	1855	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2030 hours over the Shab'a Farms.
11 May	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Marj Uyun before leaving at 1500 hours over Yarun.
	1240	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1355 hours over Kafr Killa.
12 May	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1050 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2110 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
13 May	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Rumaysh.
	1700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2320 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Rumaysh.
14 May	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0635 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1045 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1320 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 2050 hours over Rumaysh.
15 May	0550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2010 hours over Rumaysh.
	0940	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
16 May	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the North before leaving at 2210 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1115	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1235 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1415	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1855 hours over Naqurah.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Sidon and the South before leaving at 2250 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Kafr Killa.
17 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1650 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1535 hours over Naqurah.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, Jubayl, Kisrawan, the Shuf and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1635 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over Batrun and the South before leaving at 1410 hours over Rumaysh.
	1845	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0220 hours on 18 May over Aytarun.
	1955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Sa'diyat and Naqurah before leaving at 0110 hours on 18 March over the sea west of Naqurah.
18 May	0040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea west of Sa'diyat and Naqurah before leaving at 0255 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1600	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
19 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1030 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	1730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2200 hours over Kafr Killa.
20 May	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1520 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Naqurah.
	1755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1845 hours over Rumaysh.
21 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Zahlah, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 1410 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2330 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Akkar, the North and Hirmil before leaving at 0145 hours on 22 May over Alma al-Sha'b.
22 May	0215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Akkar before leaving at 0715 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1300	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1445 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0430 hours on 23 May over Rumaysh.
23 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Naqurah.
	1430	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1720 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1500	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 1615 hours over Naqurah.
	1625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the North before leaving at 2015 hours over Rumaysh.
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea between Sidon and Naqurah before leaving at 2210 hours over Rumaysh.
24 May	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1035 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the North before leaving at 1700 hours over Naqurah.
	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Zahlah, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1940 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1450	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1615 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	2045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2130 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	2110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0700 hours on 25 May over Rumaysh.
25 May	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1440 hours over the sea off Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0130 hours on 26 May over Aytarun.
26 May	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2335 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Alayh, the Shuf and Bisharri before disappearing from radar screens at 1325 hours over Bisharri.
27 May	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2115 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1345 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2025 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
28 May	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering from within occupied Palestinian territory at the Jubiyah position. It flew in a circle over the Lebanese Army position of Minarah before leaving at 0740 hours towards Shaykh Abbad, in occupied territory.
	1735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Sidon. It circled over the South before leaving at 1945 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
30 May	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Riyaq, Baalbek and Akkar before leaving at 1940 hours over Yarun.
	2055	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2310 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2130	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over Jubayl and the South before leaving at 2210 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
31 May	1900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2125 hours over Kafr Killa.

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Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Promotion and protection of human rights

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 24 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following urgent matter.

The continuing aggression by the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan has led to the temporary occupation of a significant part of my country's territory, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the seven adjacent districts and some exclaves. The war has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, ruined cities, towns and villages in Azerbaijan and resulted in the forcible expulsion of more than 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and properties.

The international community has consistently deplored, in the strongest terms, the use of military force against Azerbaijan and the resulting occupation of its territories, as reflected in Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), thus rejecting any actions violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and refusing to recognize as legitimate the situation created through such actions.

However, the impunity still enjoyed by the perpetrators of the crimes committed in the course of the aggression contributes to Yerevan's growing sense of permissiveness. As a result, despite the ongoing political process towards the earliest settlement of the conflict, flagrant violations by Armenia of international humanitarian law and international human rights law continue.

Since the beginning of the conflict, Armenia has extensively practised the taking and holding of hostages and mistreatment and summary execution of prisoners of war and other captives. Thus, at the beginning of July 2018, 3,875 citizens of Azerbaijan were registered as missing as a result of the conflict, including 707 civilians. Among

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the civilians, 67 are children, 265 are women and 324 are elderly persons. It has been established that 871 of the 3,875 missing persons were taken as either prisoners of war or hostages, including 267 civilians, of whom 29 are children, 98 are women and 112 are elderly persons.

A clear list of the missing citizens of Azerbaijan has been submitted to Armenia through the International Committee of the Red Cross and is being regularly updated. However, Armenia has failed to account either properly or at all for the missing persons within its control and to conduct a prompt and effective investigation into the arguable claims that such persons have been taken into its custody and have not been seen since.

On 11 July 2014, the Armenian armed forces brutally killed an Azerbaijani civilian, Hassan Hassanov, and captured Dilgam Asgarov and Shahbaz Guliyev, who were attempting to visit the graves of their parents in the occupied Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan. The Armenian side not only did not release these civilians but also fabricated charges against them and unlawfully sentenced Mr. Asgarov to life imprisonment and Mr. Guliyev to 22 years in jail, while the body of Mr. Hassanov was returned to Azerbaijan, with the facilitation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, after almost three months, on 2 October 2014.

The images of Mr. Asgarov and Mr. Guliyev before and after their capture, which the Armenian side made available to the public to exert psychological pressure on their families and relatives, clearly demonstrate that they were subjected to torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment.

Illegitimately depriving Mr. Asgarov and Mr. Guliyev of liberty and keeping them in captivity despite the appeals of the international community are yet further proof of contempt for human rights, intolerance and hatred at the core of Armenia's policy of aggression, occupation and ethnic cleansing.

The Republic of Azerbaijan expects that the United Nations, including its relevant human rights mechanisms and procedures, will not remain indifferent to the fate of Mr. Asgarov and Mr. Guliyev, who are suffering from serious health problems, and will spare no effort to ensure their immediate and unconditional release and reunification with their families.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 40 and 72, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative